


























I argue that reconciling nature with human experience requires a new ontology in
which nature is refigured as being in and of itself meaningful, thus reconfiguring tra-
ditional dualisms and the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. But this refiguring of
nature entails a method in which nature itself can exhibit its conceptual reconfigura-
tion—otherwise we get caught in various conceptual and methodological problems
that surreptitiously reduplicate the problem we are seeking to resolve. I first intro-
duce phenomenology as a methodology fit to this task, then show how life manifests
a field inwhich nature in and of itself exhibitsmeaningfulness, such that this field can
serve as a starting point for this phenomenological project. Finally, I take immuno-
genesis as an example in which living phenomena can guide insights into the ontol-
ogy in virtue of which meaning arises in nature.
1. Introduction
The topic of phenomenology and naturalism raises the question
whether human experience can be naturalized, that is, conceptualized
as integral with nature as we understand it. A central context for this
question is ongoing debates about the relation between mind and
nature. My studies lead me to think that debates and problems in
this area are deeply informed – and led astray – by an uncritically ac-
cepted philosophical and scientific commitment that we can trace
back to Descartes at least, namely the concept of nature as a
moving material system devoid of inherent meaningfulness.
Mindful human experience, as meaningful, is thus at odds with
nature and cannot be naturalized – hence the now classic ‘hard
problem of consciousness’, the problem of qualia, and so on.1 If,
1 An example of an ‘easy problem’ is explaining our ability to react dif-
ferently, on the level of behaviour, to different colours. The ‘hard problem’
in this case is explaining how it is that over and above such discriminative
behaviour there is an experiencing of red that is qualitatively different
than the experiencing of blue, and how there is, in the first place, an
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on the contrary, we can show that meaning is not just ‘in the head’ but
is right there and indeed arises in the very movement of nature, then
we can find a way to conceptualize mindful human experience as in-
tegral with nature. My thought is that showing this entails a new on-
tology of nature – a new way of conceptualizing what nature is.
To further contextualize my claim, let me note that the mind-body
and mind-nature debates typically take mind as the sole ontological
and conceptual difficulty, as if the obvious problem is fitting a very
strange thing, mind, into a body and nature that cannot harbour
mind. In recent years, though, various researchers (including some
in this volume2) have argued that we must rethink our typical – in
fact latently Cartesian – concepts of the body. In my terms, this re-
thinking of the body amounts to the revelation of the body not as a
meaningless machine but as a system whose living dynamics and be-
haviour already exhibit cognitive and meaning generating character-
istics. Some, such as the philosopher Renaud Barbaras3 go further,
experiencing going on that is felt by and for a subject. The latter is also
known as the problem of qualia, the problem of explaining the qualitative
aspect of experience. A locus classicus of the ‘hard problem’ is David
Chalmers, ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2 (1995), 200–219. J. Shear, Explaining Consciousness:
The “Hard Problem” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) provides an excel-
lent collection on this issue.
Note, however, that from a phenomenological perspective a lot is already
presumed and embedded in this division between the easy and the hard
problem. For example, it can be argued that this way of dividing the
problem already presupposes and reduplicates the sort of dualism that it
seeks to undo, leading tovarious conceptual,methodological, and explanatory
questions or problems. In part what is at stake in this paper is showing how
living phenomena (which are surely integral to the evolved mind!) challenge
such a division between easy problems (about how natural systems work)
and hard problems (about understanding natural systems as having experien-
tial or meaningful aspects). This is in aid of having this challenge reorient our
research and inquiry.
2 E.g. M. Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), S. Burwood, P. Gilbert and K.
Lennon, Philosophy of Mind (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1999).
3 See, e.g. Renaud Barbaras, ‘The Movement of the Living as the
Originary Foundation of Perceptual Intentionality’, in J. Petitot, F.J.
Varela, B. Pachoud and J.-M. Roy (eds.) Naturalizing Phenomenology:
Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, J. (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
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insisting that resolving the mind-body problem similarly entails a
new concept and ontology of nature. The moves afoot in effect
expand the field of meaning, by noticing how the dynamics of
living and natural systems in fact already exhibit a kind of meaning-
fulness that could harbour mind. But this expansion of meaning
entails new and challenging ways of conceptualizing the body and
nature. This is the move I pursue here: the hard problem isn’t figur-
ing out mind, but refiguring nature.
My pursuit of this refiguring of nature hinges on a methodological
strategy that stems from phenomenology. Phenomenology is a radically
empirical philosophy. It aims to begin with what shows itself in
experience, and to have what shows itself educate us into the proper
ways to conceptualize things. In keeping with this radical empiricism,
my phenomenological strategy is to let nature itself, as empirically
manifest phenomenon, educate us into properly conceiving nature,
the way in which meaning is at work in it, and the ontology that
makes this possible. But to do this I first need to show that experience
makes available a field of nature, or more precisely, of life, that, as an
empirically manifest phenomenon, can itself educate us into a new
concept of nature. I call this ‘life as transcendental field’: life as man-
ifesting a field of irreducible meaning, that, as meaningful, can orient
and educate our understanding of nature. Note that I here use ‘em-
pirical’ and ‘transcendental’ in ways that spring from the phenomen-
ological and associated traditions, but may not be typical for all
philosophical audiences. I will say more about this usage in the
next section.
In saying that life is a transcendental field within experience that
can educate us into a new concept of nature, I am saying something
provocative vis-à-vis phenomenological method as it is typically con-
strued. In the next section, I trace the methodological issue by briefly
introducing phenomenology to those not familiar with it.4 In section
4 Perhaps the best, short introduction to the project, method, and pro-
blems of phenomenology is the preface of Merleau-Ponty’s, Phenomenology
of Perception. This preface elaborates the challenges of Husserl’s phenomen-
ology as a philosophy that aims to go back to the things themselves. See, e.g.
E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1991). The central challenge is that if phenomenology is radically empirical
and guided by continual responsiveness to the things themselves, then even
its method cannot be fully settled, and it remains an open research project,
vs. a settled technique or doctrine. It is in this spirit that I here pursue phe-
nomenology. John Russon, ‘On Human Identity: The Intersubjective Path
from Body to Mind’, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 45 (2006),
307–14, helpfully articulates phenomenology as a radical empiricism.
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three I leap into an empirical-critical study of embryogenesis, so as to
describe life as a transcendental field that itself institutes irreducible
meaning. This makes life phenomenologically available within
experience, as a sort of lens into nature that can give us insight into
a new ontology. To illustrate this strategy, in which living phenomena
are studied to glean ontological insights, in the final section I suggest
how immunogenesis can let us glimpse an ontological point about
what is involved in there being meaning in nature.
I am giving a condensed report from an ongoing, larger project,
aiming to make it accessible to a broad audience.5 So no doubt
puzzles, challenges and worries will remain. A few remarks will
help give further context for my efforts here and in my larger
project. Descartes’s concept of nature as a system of merely moving
matter had the great advantage of rendering nature susceptible to
mathematical analysis. But this mathematization and his famous
dualism entail conceptualizing material movement as in and of
itself meaningless. Roughly, in Descartes’s philosophy material
nature is devoid of meaning because what actively organizes nature –
God, God’s ideas – is external to it. This dualism of matter and
what actively organizes it has a long intellectual legacy that is ever
more deeply challenged by results that reveal natural and living
systems as actively self-organizing. In recent years, a number of thin-
kers, most notably Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Susan
Oyama, have urged that living systems as active self-organizers are
already inherently mindful and meaningful to some degree.6 What
S. Gallagher, Phenomenology (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan, 2012) gives
a clear introduction to the tradition of phenomenology and its recent devel-
opments vis-à-vis cognitive science, an introduction especially helpful for
readers of this volume.
5 The larger project draws on the phenomenological results and strat-
egies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in particular his ways of studying nature
and living systems to gain insight into what he calls the institution of
meaning, a process wherein novel meaning is (to put it roughly) develop-
mentally generated within and from a system, vs. from pre-established
ideas. These issues are explored in M. Merleau-Ponty, Institution and
Passivity: Course Notes From the Collège de France (1954–55), trans. L.
Lawlor and H. Massey (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
2010), Nature: Course Notes from the Collége de France, trans. R. Vallier
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003). Unfortunately,
these are notes and sketches for lecture courses, not fully developed ideas.
6 See, e.g., Francisco J. Varela, ‘Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless
Selves’ in A.I. Tauber (ed.) Organism and the Origins of Self, (Dordrecht:
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I am doing here is drawing on phenomenology and empirical details
of embryogenesis and immunogenesis to sketch and deepen comp-
lementary conceptual and ontological insights. My results, although
developed and presented before reading Terrence Deacon’s recent
book, Incomplete Nature,7 end up resonating with his claim that
boundaries, exclusions, and absences are crucial in conceptualizing
nature as meaningful. But I believe that my approach starts
opening the way to a more philosophically and conceptually robust
program than we find in Deacon’s book, which was rightly received
with controversy and hesitation.8 Or, at least my project and approach
broaches the right problems and difficulties, whereas Deacon, I would
argue, even as he tries to turn old paradigms on their head, by empha-
sizing absences as mattering to things, in the end altogether too much
frames his insights in terms of those old paradigms, because he is just
turning them on their head, flipping them from positive to negative,
in the conceptual space of those traditions, rather than engaging in a
more radical rethinking that is educated into a new conceptual space
by the phenomena themselves. Finally, the approach taken here and
in the self-organization literature somewhat converges with the
Kluwer, 1991); E. Thompson,Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the
Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2007); S. Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental
Systems and Evolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).
7 T.W. Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter
(New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2012).
8 Evan Thompson, ‘Philosophy: Life Emergent’, Nature 480 (2011),
but especially Colin McGinn, ‘Can Anything Emerge from Nothing’,
NewYork Review of Books, (2012), challenge Deacon for not acknowledging
or sufficiently taking into account the precedents for his view in, e.g. F.G.
Varela, H.R. Maturana and R. Uribe, ‘Autopoiesis: The Organization of
Living Systems, its Characterization and a Model’, BioSystems 5 (1974),
Francisco J. Varela, ‘Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves’ in A.I.
Tauber (ed.) Organism and the Origins of Self,, (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer, 1991), ‘Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for
the Hard Problem’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996); Susan
Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution;
and Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the
Sciences ofMind. Putting aside issues of attribution,Deacon’s book is frustrat-
ing to read because it lacks some of the precision and concepts developed in
this prior philosophical and scientific work, and also because, as reviewers
have pointed out, its writing is just too sprawling and diffuse. Its central
point, which has some insight to it, gets lost, scattered and muddled.
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panpsychism that Galen Strawson pursues9, in that it takes meaning-
fulness seriously as an irreducible phenomenon pervasively manifest
in nature, yet it diverges in conceptualizing meaning as arising in
those dynamics themselves, rather than being an irreducibly inde-
pendent phenomenon.
2. Phenomenology as a Radically Empirical Challenge to
Scepticism
Phenomenology is a radically empirical philosophy that seeks to get
our conceptual frameworks right by seeking a method for letting
the phenomena tell it how to think.10 This contrasts with a method
that articulates concepts solely, or mostly, by analysis or reflection
on what we humans have said or thought about things, which, from
a phenomenological perspective, might allow cognitive prejudices,
deeply rooted or hidden in our natural attitude, to distort our con-
cepts. Phenomenology, in others words, is a descriptively and empiri-
cally drivenmethod for, asWittgenstein would put it, showing the fly
the way out of the fly bottle. But it goes further than methods such as
Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis or Kantian critique, since, in
showing the way out of the bottle, it trusts neither our existing
language nor our reflective activity as immediately obvious. It ends
up being a sort of eversion ofKantian critique: it seeks concepts mani-
fest beyond our own reflections, such that rigorously describing what
shows itself also thereby in effect describes and articulates a concep-
tual critique that has already taken place in things beyond us.
Phenomenology typically pursues this radically empirical method
by showing how, prior to philosophical reflection, the flow of our
experience, as empirically manifest, descriptively demands and war-
rants certain concepts. This paper seeks to radicalize this empiricism
even further by revealing ‘life as transcendental field’, that is, reveal-
ing life as empirically manifesting a pre-experiential field of irreduci-
ble meaning, that, as meaningful, likewise demands and warrants
certain concepts. Below I introduce this effort as extending phenom-
enology’s method of radically empirical critique. But to help contex-
tualize and orient my discussion, I first want to say something about
the terms ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’, because I am using these
terms in ways that spring from the phenomenological tradition and
9 See, Galen Strawson, ‘Real Naturalism’, Proceedings and Addresses of
the American Philosophical Association (Forthcoming).
10 See note 4.
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are not standard for all audiences, and because so much is methodo-
logically at stake throughout in my concept of the empirical.
So, first, I use ‘empirical’ in a broad, descriptive sense, to designate
that which appears and manifests itself, that which can be encoun-
tered. This gets back to the original sense and etymology of the
term ‘empirical’. This descriptive sense needs to be disentangled
from a prescriptive sense of the empirical that arises, for example,
in a classic philosophical empiricism or scientific tradition that
would already theoretically, conceptually or operationally prescribe
that the empirical is, for example, what is materially given, what
can be measured with instruments, a given that has the form of a
self-contained sense-datum, and so on. It also needs to be disen-
tangled from views that would prescribe who or what it is that can
do the encountering, such that what is encountered and who encoun-
ters it are elided, thus reducing the empirical to, for example, some-
thing merely subjective.
What is philosophically at stake in this descriptive usage is preser-
ving the empirical as a pre-theoretical domain in which we encounter
something as given (in some broad sense of given), as something
whose determinations we do not ourselves constitute or determine.
Such a pre-theoretical domain is crucial to phenomenology as a phil-
osophy that seeks to start with and be oriented by what is given, with
what insists on its own determinate characteristics, versus something
whose characteristics wemight be determining through our own con-
ceptual activity, which is perhaps prejudiced. The methodological
issue here is keeping us from making mistakes by checking our
claims and concepts against the empirical, and this procedure is
begged if we start with a theoretically overloaded conception of
what the empirical is.
It should be added that such a domain of givenness is methodolo-
gically necessary to getting the project of science or philosophy off the
ground. For example, for science to end up with some prescriptive
specification of what counts as empirical in a scientific sense, the
scientist must start with something given on a pre-scientific level,
for example, the world that she encounters, that prompts and
checks her scientific efforts—and checks her concept of the empirical.
And such a domain, as pre-philosophical, is also crucial to getting phil-
osophy off the ground. For example, the above noted elision between
the empirical and merely subjective experience hinges on various
epistemological and ontological presuppositions that, in the phenom-
enological project pursued here, would need to be justified on the
basis of what can be empirically encountered. This twofold point
about science and philosophy is a key starting point of Maurice
323
The Nature of Meaning
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, see the preface
especially.
In this respect phenomenology is a radical empiricism, in that it
turns to what is empirically given in order to be educated into the
proper conception of the empirical, experience and so on.
Phenomenology is not unempirical, unless one presupposes that
what is given to us to experience is ‘merely subjective’ (mere intro-
spection, etc.) and therefore doesn’t count as empirical, according
to some standard of the empirical. But that ‘mere subjectivity’
would need to be proven, and such a proof, it can be argued, would
need to start with presuppositions about what subjectivity is, that
something ‘merely subjective’ is possible and cogent, and such pre-
suppositions might be betrayed by the phenomena. But, we cannot
test this if we already decide in advance that the empirical and empiri-
cally manifest phenomena are merely subjective. What is radical
about phenomenology is that is seeks to root the standard of the em-
pirical in what is empirically given, it seeks to go back to the empirical
as starting point. Here the terminology of phenomenology as radical
plays on the connation of ‘root’ in ‘radical’, via the Latin ‘radix’.
Second, I use the term ‘transcendental’ to designate determinate
characteristics of a domain that, in terms of that domain itself, turn
out to be unsurpassable and thence irreducible: that without which
a given domain could not be the domain that it is. A classic illustration
is to be found in Kant’s argument that a pure intuition of space is a
transcendental condition of there being a domain of spatial experi-
ence. The transcendental is not to be confused with the transcendent,
which, in my usage, is something conceptualized as existing over and
above, beyond, a given domain, for example, Platonist ideas con-
ceived as being beyond the domain of appearances of which they
are ideas.
As discussed at the end, to say that life is a transcendental field is to
say that in life we find a domain in which meaning is manifest, and
that we cannot surpass or escape finding that this is so, or reduce
the terms of this meaning-manifestation to some other domain
over, above or beyond the terms of the domain of life itself. To say
that life manifests this empirically is to say that our encounter with
living phenomena, if oriented by and to those phenomena them-
selves, is such that life itself in our very encounter with it manifests
meaning-structure: it is not wewho determine that life is meaningful,
life itself in its very living determines itself that way, and that is an
unsurpassable characteristic of life. Note that the scientific empiri-
cist, in the typical, current views of scientific empiricism, might pre-
cisely deny that meaning is empirically manifest in living
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phenomena, becausemeaning is not quantifiable or given in amanner
that is empirically satisfactory for the scientist, except insofar say, as
meaning is equated with information (where information, however, is
in fact neutral to meaning). But the larger issue at stake here and in
phenomenology is precisely what scientific knowing is, and what
experience and the empirical are, how meaning fits with these, and
so on. And the view developed here is that meaning is an irreducible
element of living phenomena, even if the traditional scientist can ab-
stract from this in certain kinds of inquiries.
With these terms in mind, let me now introduce my approach to
showing that meaning is an irreducible element of living phenomena,
and that life thence demands and warrants certain concepts. My ap-
proach extends traditional phenomenology’s strategy of describing
the flow of empirically manifest experience so as to reveal it as
having a meaningful structure that demands certain concepts. Let
me illustrate this extension and what is methodologically behind it
in terms of issues of conceptual critique, by drawing on Husserl,
the founder of modern phenomenology. He discovered that the
flow of cognitive experience itself manifests what he calls a ‘horizon
structure’.11 For example, a table appears as such in virtue of its
present aspect inherently indicating a determinate yet open-ended
horizon of other as yet indeterminate aspects that are revealable as I
move around. The condition of possibility for the appearance of a
table, as empirically manifest in experience thus challenges (as we’ll
see below) clear-cut conceptual oppositions between actuality and
potentiality. Describing this horizon structure, as it is itself manifest,
thus amounts to the articulation of a descriptive, empirical critique of
classic conceptions of actuality and potentiality. The field of experi-
ence thus offers a critical lens into conceptual and ontological points.
In developing this descriptive, empirical critique, phenomenology
challenges what I call our anthropocentric prejudice: a tendency to take
what is obvious to us as human beings in our everyday lives as amodel
for grasping things in their own terms. Husserl’s horizons provide an
example: actuality and potentiality are easy to conceptualize on the
model of a storehouse of possibilities, where actuality ‘takes out’
and activates a possibility already determinately there in the store-
house. But Husserl shows that horizonal phenomena themselves
challenge our human storehouse model, since actualities and potenti-
alities dynamically reshape one another in open-ended ways. There is
no fixed storehouse given in advance, the basis of the actuality-poten-
tiality dynamic is itself dynamic. This phenomenological structure is
11 See, e.g. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
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appropriately dubbed a ‘horizon’, precisely because horizons out
there in the world are ontologically strange vis-à-vis our deep anthro-
pocentric prejudice which seeks to grasp all phenomena as ‘stuff’,
‘solid things’ or ‘all there’.12
Now science also identifies and challenges anthropocentric preju-
dices. For example, it makes a great deal of sense to us to conceptual-
ize things as having and reflecting essential and fixed identities, but
Darwin famously shows that such thinking is challenged by living
things and muddles our conception of them. Indeed, the life sciences
typically conceptualize living systems in terms of the latest human
technology, but then find that life challenges such concepts. Yet
science typically solves such conceptual problems by discarding
one humanmodel for another. Evelyn FoxKeller’s studies of shifting
concepts of ‘the gene’ gives nice examples of this, for example, with
the conception of the gene in terms of information technology, as
‘information’ or ‘program’.13 Let me be clear: such models let
science do productive, predictive work. But in the end, even a predic-
tivemodel could very well betray the phenomena – and to address this
we might need new concepts altogether (versus merely correcting
muddled concepts).
To rule out this betrayal of phenomena, and to get our concepts
right, we would need a rigorous, principled way to show that
natural phenomena, in their own terms, fit with our concepts, that
they are not merely anthropocentric projections. With this obser-
vation, we move from the work of science to the worries of philos-
ophy. Methodologically, we would beg such worries if we tried to
12 H. Bergson,Creative Evolution (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998) alerts us
to a similar issue in showing that durational phenomena challenge our ‘logic
of solids’.
13 E. Fox Keller, Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological
Development with Models, Metaphors and Machines (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002), The Century of the Gene (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Refiguring Life: Metaphors of
Twentieth-Century Biology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,
1995) are particularly good at tracing such issues. One issue here is that
human-made machines are designed to leverage simplifications that we
can make with regard to natural systems. For example, when we arrange
gears or circuits to do something, we focus on certain kinds of isolated inter-
actions only. So when we produce a machine whose circuitry has a function
similar to that of a natural system, we can think that the natural system’s
function is reducible to the clear-cut circuitry we have produced, losing
sight of the very messy way that natural systems actually work and develop.
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resolve them through anthropocentric means or perspectives. This is
where phenomenology comes in as rigorously seeking to let phenom-
ena lead us to our conception of them. It tries to cut short our worry
about being stuck in amerely anthropocentric position –which is pre-
cisely the sceptical worry that meaningful experience is cut off from
nature – by leaping out of that worry altogether. It does this by an em-
pirical demonstration that in factwhat is given in experience is already
something more than just our anthropocentric position merely. In
other words, phenomenology is radically empirical to the extent of
saying it is an empirical question whether we are in fact stuck in an
anthropocentric view split from nature. And, by the way, the very
idea of an ‘anthropocentric view’ precisely buys into a human manu-
factured concepts of self-enclosed views and of what human beings
are – which all need phenomenological critique.
In slightly more technical terms, we would seem to run into a
methodological difficulty deploying phenomenology to address our
problem about experience and nature. This is because phenomenol-
ogy aims to start fromwhat we call ‘experience’. So it would seem that
any of its conceptual results about nature would bemerely subjective,
as they spring from our experience. My claim, though, is that this
view gets both phenomenology and experience wrong. In fact, it
begs the question of what experience is, it presumes that experience
is just ‘in the head’. Indeed, I would argue that Husserl, the
founder of phenomenology, understands that we must be radically
empirical in letting thinking and experience themselves empirically
show us what they are. He thereby discovers that thinking is not
really a Cartesian ‘I think’ that could be detached from the body
and nature, but in fact inherently involves a bodily-kinaesthetic ‘I
can’. Bit by bit, living movements beyond us are revealed as integral
to experience. Husserl thus suggests away in which living and natural
movements, beyond the anthropocentric, are integral to the experien-
tial field, such that they could give us an educating lens into a new
concept of nature itself. This is the phenomenological strategy I
want to pursue.
Now I have to confess that this strategy leaves thorny scholarly and
methodological difficulties. Some of these prolong the above worry
that phenomenology cannot rightly integrate nature and experience,
and some prolong the sceptical worry that phenomenology can never
get beyond subjective experience. You can see that these methodo-
logical worries in fact coincide with our very question about the
relation of experience and nature. I also have to confess that in
beating my head over these worries, I find that the response boils
down to insisting, as above, that the answers to these worries are
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empirical: the worries start with unempirical presumptions about the
cogency of a scepticism that posits a merely subjective experience that
stands outside of nature as object of scepticism, and presumptions as
to what experience, nature and phenomenology are. It is an empirical
question whether phenomenology is possible and whether experience
makes nature available as a meaningful field for phenomenological
study. The phenomenologist insists that her conceptual results are
empirically descriptive: what will convince you she’s got the concepts
that truly lead us out of the bottle is theway things themselves are, not
an argument she contains within herself. The sceptic will respond
that we can’t get anywhere through mere description, that is all too
naïve. But in saying that, the sceptic presumes that we must first of
all run our claims through our own autonomous critique and reflec-
tion. But that presumption is the very thing that leads to, invites
and demands scepticism. In a word, phenomenology begins with a
radically empirical critique of what I shall call ‘the sceptical
complex’ of philosophy. This is why, for example, phenomenology
must begin with what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘perceptual faith’, and
interrogation as a ‘hyper-reflection’ that begins from reflection’s in-
stallation in being, versus the claimed autonomy of classical reflection
and critique.14 Put otherwise, if we autonomously and reflectively
prescribe what counts as the empirical, which is what Descartes in
effect does in order to get past radical doubt and to an indubitably
empirical science, then we shoo ourselves into the flybottle of the
sceptical complex. And in shooing itself into this complex, reflection
eschews any resource for getting out.
Now the sceptical complex is symmetrical with the very experi-
ence-nature divide that is our concern. Getting out of it, I contend,
14 Here I should say that in pursuing my strategy I am more informed
byMerleau-Ponty’s phenomenology thanHusserl’s, sinceMerleau-Ponty is
always alert, from the start, to the way that phenomenology operates from
within the domain that it itself is studying. This is already noted in the
Phenomenology of Perception’s preface and its concepts of radical reflection
and the phenomenal field as not only the topic of phenomenology, but the
transcendental condition of phenomenological analysis. This immanence
of phenomenological philosophy in its object of study becomes thematic
in his later ontology, e.g., in the concept of reversibility. Put otherwise,
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is much more radical in its critique of a
Cartesian cogito whose reflections could operate independently of the
object of phenomenological reflection. And his critique of what I call the
sceptical complex precisely leads him to a study of nature as not outside phe-
nomenology, but as its condition.
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entails an empirically driven demonstration that experience already
manifests resources for a critique of this divide, namely: it manifests
life as a transcendental, irreducible, field of meaning that manifests a
lens into an ontology that undoes the experience-nature divide.
3. Meaning, Sense, and Life as Transcendental Field
The demonstration that experience already manifests resources for a
critique of the experience-nature divide first requires a phenomeno-
logical description of meaning. As a first step, I urge us to describe
meaning through the term ‘sense’. Here I draw on Merleau-Ponty,
who discovers that human meaning is at root a bodily phenomenon
that emerges from the way the body fits into and is oriented by a situ-
ation beyond and prior towhat ismeant. This issue nicely resonates in
the French word for meaning, ‘sens’, which also connotes direction
and sensation. It also lurks in the English ‘sense’, as when we speak
of mirror images having different senses, or things not making
sense when we can’t fit them together. The shift from ‘meaning’ to
‘sense’ helps challenge our anthropocentric prejudice of thinking
meaning is ‘in the head’, since sense emerges in a fit with something
beyond ‘the head’. The sceptical worry is that this fit with something
beyond is merely our projection, in which case experience and nature
remain divided.
Fits between things entail differences between them. But not all
differences manifest fit or sense. Descriptively, sense involves some-
thing showing itself as this, not that, such that the difference between
this and that is itself at issue in and makes a difference in and to that
very showing. Consider a familiar case in human life: grasping the
sense of love entails encountering it as emphatically not being hate
(etc.), and moreover encountering the difference between love and
hate (etc.) as salient, as making a difference, in that very encounter.
Someone pre-pubescently oriented to erotic behaviour, but who
does not yet grasp that/how such behaviour makes a difference (is
salient) to the erotic as such, does not (yet) quite grasp the erotic.15
Sense entails differences that make a difference (a phrasing that
15 Wemight see the erotic in this pre-pubescent behaviour. But the pre-
pubescent person her/himself isn’t quite involved in that as such. This is
why we can discover and be initiated into the erotic. Behind this example
is Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity: Course Notes From the Collège
de France (1954–55), 21–25.
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echoes but pushes farther Gregory Bateson’s discussion of infor-
mation as a difference that makes a difference16).
On this description, we can detect sense in a broader field of life.
For example, in bacteria, the difference between the distant presence
of glucose, versus the presence of something else, makes a difference
to the swimming behaviour of the bacterium. Moreover this is a
difference the detection of which the bacterium itself works to main-
tain. It is thus a difference that makes a difference to a bacterium. If
you don’t find that difference making a difference, you have a dead
bacterium (or one not sensitive to glucose). And distant gold
doesn’t make a difference in this way to the bacterium. To this
extent we can say that glucose is meaningful to the bacterium, but
gold isn’t. This point echoes in Varela’s enactive approach to cogni-
tion, which grants bacteria a kind of cognition in such behaviour.17
But I want to turn to embryos, through biologist Eric Davidson’s
remarkable 2006 book,The Regulatory Genome18, which shows, in as-
tounding detail, how bilateran animal embryogenesis can be ex-
plained in terms of a ‘regulatory genome’. The central problem for
Davidson and embryology is explaining how one totipotent cell de-
velops into a highly differentiated and species-typical body, even in
face of perturbations. Development to type, despite perturbations,
is said to be regulatory. Davidson focuses on the genome as the
enabler of regulatory development, hence his concept of the regulat-
ory genome. His central claim is that the regulatory genome amounts
to a computer composed of hardwired genetic elements. The genomic
computer’s complex information processing capacity is what explains
16 See G. Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York,
NY: E.P. Dutton, 1979). Bateson’s formula is in the background of both
Evan Thompson’sMind in Life and Terrence Deacon’s Incomplete Nature.
17 See D. Bray,Wetware: AComputer in Every Living Cell (NewHaven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2009) for a detailed discussion of the biochemi-
cal basis of such chemotaxis. Bray conceptualizes the process in terms of
computation, but see Varela’s work for a critique of such an account.
Varela insists that the self-organization and maintenance of the living
system allows difference detection. My contention is that it is the manifes-
tation of active self-organization that distinguishes between the difference
detection that we might find in a machine context, and differences that
making a difference. They make a difference in the relevant sense because
these differences sustain the operation of a self-organizing system that ac-
tively works to maintain its self-organization as difference making.
18 E.H. Davidson, The Regulatory Genome: Gene Regulatory Networks
in Development and Evolution (Burlington, MA: Academic Press, 2006);
hereafter abbreviated as RG.
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development. Information processing, then, determines where, say,
legs versus antennae are to grow. It is because this processing is inher-
ently flexible in responding to changing inputs that development can
be regulatory.
In our terms, such processing would in fact generate sense. Proper
positioning of organs within the organism’s layout is crucial to the
viability and thence salience of the organs and organism: that this
organ is to be a leg, not an antenna, and that the leg is to go here,
not there, is a difference that makes a difference in and to the living
organism. Sense thus appears in embryos. But the skeptic urges
sense is not really there in nature itself, it is just our projection of
meaning into nature. Science would typically endorse this claim,
because science can show how differences are produced, say by infor-
mation processing, without granting they are differences that make a
difference for or to something beyond consciousness. The issue is
this: can the production of differences be reduced to informational
processes that can, thereby, be abstracted from any fit, orientation,
or embeddeness in nature and living systems beyond their informa-
tional formula or algorithm? Or do we need to describe and concep-
tualize sense as inseparably generated right there in living, natural
movement itself?
Let’s go back toDavidson.He argues that each regulatoryDNA se-
quence of the regulatory genome ‘amounts essentially to a hardwired
biological computational device’.19 The regulatory genome is ‘a vast
delocalized computer’20 and its operation ‘can be symbolized, as in a
computer program, by a series of conditional logic statements’.21
While Davidson acknowledges differences between the regulatory
genome and a digital computer, he nonetheless conceptualizes it as
executing an information processing task that can be analyzed and
operates as a series of modular information processing subtasks.
This implies that generated differences are conceptually reducible




22 See Sorin Istrail and Eric H. Davidson, ‘Logic functions of the
genomic cis-regulatory code’, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 102 (2005), and Sorin Istrail, Smadar Ben-Tabou De-Leon and
Eric H. Davidson, ‘The Regulatory Genome and the Computer’,
Developmental Biology 310 (2007), for notes on how this system is not en-
tirely like a digital compute. This is also noted in RG. Nonetheless, in RG
the emphasis on information processing is clear in the preface (x) and con-
clusion (239–40), and is central in many sections of the book, especially
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involve what I am calling sense or differences that make a difference.
Is this right?
But not even Davidson is so simple on the matter, and what my
phenomenological strategy demands is looking at how the regulatory
genome actually manifests itself and operates. This will show, I
contend, that the genome’s modular operation as an ‘information
processor’ in fact depends on a complex embeddedness in its environ-
ment. This environment is first of all the internal milieu of the
growing body, which is in turn embedded in and open to a broader
environmental surround. I argue that the bodily environment of
the regulatory genome in fact plays a key role in orchestrating devel-
opment: the operation of the regulatory genome as information pro-
cessor and the growth of the body are reciprocal and ontologically
internal to one another. In effect, I am arguing for something like em-
bedded, extended, and enactive cognition on amicro-scale, where not
cognitive, but developmental discriminations, are at issue. And
because of this embeddedness, we find sense, not just information.
We need some technical precision to make this claim and its con-
ceptual implications regarding meaning clear and compelling, and I
am afraid I have to be all too terse, since it would not be possible
here to cover the details of the biochemical workings of the develop-
mental systems that Davidson studies.23 My claim is that the
chapter 1. Also seeRG 59–68 and 135–144. As FoxKeller astutely observes,
when Davidson specifies the ‘program’ that a specific regulatory network
would compute ‘as it would bewritten for simulation on an actual computer’
(which Davidson also specifies in RG 50) ‘this is not a program written to
simulate the behavior of a model that has been elsewhere specified’, as
when we use a computer program to simulate a set of equations that describe
a physical system. The program that Davidson claims to have traced in the
operation of the genetics, ‘is itself the model’. I.e., Davidson’s claim is not
that the algorithm he has elucidated specifies how to emulate the behavioural
effects of the genetic network he is studying. Rather, the genetic network
itself computes that algorithm. See Evelyn Fox Keller, ‘Models Of and
Models For: Theory and Practice in Contemporary Biology’, Philosophy
of Science 67 (Proceedings) (2000), which is commenting on an earlier
article by Chiou-Hwa Yuh, Hamid Bolourie and Eric H. Davidson,
‘Genomic Cis-Regulatory Logic: Experimental and Computational
Analysis of Sea-Urchin Gene’, Science 279 (1998).
23 For some of these details and for some a more detailed argument for
some of my points here, from within the phenomenological context, see my
article ‘Merleau-Ponty, Passivity and Science: From Structure, Sense and
Expression, to Life as Phenomenal Field, via the Regulatory Genome,’
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regulatory genome ought not be conceptualized as a classic computer,
a finite state automaton – an anthropocentric strategy.24 Instead, the
operation of the regulatory genome involves something much stran-
ger and harder to think about, namely the organism as what I call a
‘finite state structure’, or better, a ‘self-articulating structure’. This
structure encompasses both the regulatory genome and the growing
body (in its broader environment), as ontologically internal to one
another.25 Here I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s early concept of struc-
ture, e.g., his description of the soap bubble as shaping itself
through its overall dynamic in its environment, such that we cannot
separate a formula or idea of the bubble’s shape from the bubble’s
existence or vice versa.26 In other words, what is responsible for the
bubble’s shape, which wemight conceptualize as a function in infor-
mation processing terms, is inseparably embedded in the very dy-
namics of the bubble. The developing organism is like this bubble
structure, but the regulatory genome gives the organism as structure
a dynamic and recursively complex articulacy and responsiveness that
the bubble lacks, what I call its self-articulating character, which
enables regulatory development. Without the regulatory genome,
the organism would not have this self-articulacy, but, crucially, it is
not the genome on its own, as information processor, that does the articu-
lating: what does that is the organism with its genome.
To support and deepen this point, let me note that the regulatory
genome does not specify an already fully fixed, overall growth
process, as if development merely reads out steps of a fixed plan.27
The frog egg, for example, doesn’t grow directly into a frog, it first
Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s
Thought 14 (in press).
24 This includes analogue computers, i.e. it should also not be concep-
tualized as an analogue computer.
25 On the importance of the environment to development, see C. van
der Weele, Images of Development: Environmental Causes in Ontogeny
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), but also M.W.
Kirschner and J.C. Gerhart, The Plausibility of Life: Resolving Darwin’s
Dilemma (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
26 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. A. Fisher
(London: Methuen, 1965), 129–160.
27 Cf. the point in Kirschner and Gerhart, The Plausibility of Life:
Resolving Darwin’s Dilemma that what evolves in evolution are not so
much organisms or blueprints for organisms, but ways of making organ-
isms; correlatively, what the genome specifies are ways ofmaking organisms,
and nothing is fully specified by such specifications absent the making.
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grows into a tadpole that only then can grow into a frog. The tadpole-
body is thus imbricate in whatever we might call the ‘frog-plan’. It’s
not the genome itself that pulls off the trick of being a frog-plan; to
have a frog-plan that can actually make a frog requires the genome op-
erating in a tadpole body, because it is only as spread out and
rhythmed in a growing tadpole body that the genome is able to
affect and enable frog development. The regulatory genome is not
building and assembling parts according to an algorithmic plan,
but complexly modulating the dynamics of the growing body.
Development operates recursively, by modulating prior bodily-
stages to develop new plans. It’s more like London building on and
through its imbricate past than Brasilia rolling out over an empty
plane according to a master-plan. The operation of the regulatory
genome is thus always internally related to ‘its’ body.28 Again,
while we can (rightly) construe the regulatory genome as exhibiting
informational processing characteristics analogous to those of our
machines, that does not mean the regulatory genome as it is itself
manifest operates as or actually is a mere information processor or
program for differences. This is an abstraction conduced by our
anthropocentric models.29
To put it another way, the regulatory genome works by recursively
responding to genetic signals in ways that modulate these signals but
also modulate the very way the genome responds to these signals. To
this degree, the regulatory genome approximates to a classic finite
state automaton, which has computational power precisely in recur-
sively switching itself from state to state, based on inputs – where
each state has different sets of responses to inputs. Now classic
finite state automata depend, for their operation, on their program
and fixedmechanics, which classically involve a clock or other coordi-
nation system to orchestrate and sequence computations. But, given
the regulatory genome’s internal relation to the body the genomic
‘computer’ not only grows, what orchestrates its ‘computation’ is
the very body whose development it is regulating. We can’t really con-
ceptualize the regulatory genome as an information processor that
28 Points such as these are also at stake in the argument in E. Jablonka
and M.J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic,
Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2005) that living material dynamics of parent organisms
are inherited by and shape the development of animal eggs.




in and of itself generates developmental differences; the regulatory
genome’s ‘processing’ is as much regulated and orchestrated by the
body that it regulates as it regulates that body. To demonstrate
another way: any program that runs on a classic Turing machine
can be specified in abstraction and run on any other Turing
machine. But you can’t do that with the regulatory genome. As
cloning shows, you can’t simply take the genome from one organism
and stick it in just any organism, expecting it to be viable: you have to
stick it in the right sort of organism, and in an organism in the right
state. In other words, the regulatory genome’s operation is open to
and embedded in further dynamics beyond it. Indeed, we find that
cellular dynamics and states can be epigenetically inherited, and
modulate development.30
It is this embeddedness in something beyond information and the
genome, in bodies and environments, that I think warrants my claim
that embryogenesis manifests sense, something more than differences
produced by an abstractable or idealizable information processing
system. We find differences that make a difference to and in the or-
ganism, insofar as the generation of these differences is inseparable
from the very life, body and environment in which these differences
arise. And all of these differences are being generated – I would say
instituted – on a level far below that of movement or perception, on
a kind of pre-perceptual-kinaesthetic level, in which the organism
is pre-affectively feeling itself out, in a way that will eventually
enable it to feel the world.
To recap: The scientific move I am challenging would say that the
ordered production of developmental differences can be boiled down
to abstract informational processes that can be analyzed without re-
ference to anything like a point of view or meaning. The differences
are meaningful to us, but not in themselves. Against this, my effort
was to return to the phenomena themselves, as revealed by science,
and have the phenomena challenge the anthropocentric conceptual
models, in this case computational, that enable the above claim.
What we find when we do this is that the ordered production differ-
ences are oriented by and inseparably embedded in the dynamics of
the living body. The differences are not specified by an algorithm ab-
stractly coded and inherited in genetic material; there is no code apart
from the full fledged differential development of the living body.
This is whywemust speak here of sense, oriented by life and environ-
mental embeddedness, versus abstract information decoded by an
30 See Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions.
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abstract standard.31 And this allowsme to argue that the sensewe find
manifest in human experience is also manifest in life more generally.
For Merleau-Ponteians, the point can be put in terms of
expression. Primary expression creatively figures out what is ex-
pressed, through a gestural process inherent in and open to the
body. The genome is not a fully determinate program, but a modu-
lator of a development that becomes determinate only through devel-
opmental movement. The organism thus figures itself out in
developmental movement, which is thus proto-gestural, in that its
unfolding is inseparable from developmental movement. To this
degree development is expressive and needs to be conceptualized in
terms of sense.
This lets me speak of life as a transcendental field of sense. A full
account of this term would take more room than I have, but here’s
the basic thought: In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl engages us
in a transcendental reduction that suspends all already given or pre-
supposed claims of meaning. He shows us that in the midst of this
suspension, in ‘my pure living’, cognitive experience appears as
having a self-evidently meaningful determinacy.32 For Husserl, this
institutes an irreducible and thus transcendental field of sense,
which, as sensible, is an empirically manifest platform for justifying
philosophical claims (contra the sceptic who can anchor justification
only in purely internal criteria). My point is that once we have scien-
tific access to nature, we find that life in fact also institutes a transcen-
dental field of sense – but beyond ourselves merely. Strategically and
methodologically this is important, because nature thus shows itself
as a platform for making claims about it. This means that there is a
sense, a meaning, beyond human experience as anthropocentric.
This can give us a non-anthropocentric lens into such meaning.
31 On this point, also see Henri Atlan and Irun R. Cohen, ‘Immune
Information, Self-Organization and Meaning’ International Immunology
10 (1998) on information versus meaning in the immune system. E.M.
Neumann-Held and C. Rehmann-Sutter, Genes in Development: Re-
Reading the Molecular Paradigm (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2006) contains many chapters urging that there are no genes or genetic
codes apart from the living body and development; this also contains a
helpful chapter by Fox Keller that complicates discussion of the body and
the environment.
32 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 60.
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4. Sketch of an Ontology of Sense Within Nature
Philosophy, though, remains tangled in the hall of mirrors and
shadow boxing inaugurated by its sceptical complex. Mightn’t all
of the above remain our own projection? It might show the way in
which we can grasp sense as in nature, but how is it really there in
nature? We find it easy to grasp that there is sense in us because
sense is so self-evident in self-reflection. This is precisely what
Descartes reveals in the cogito. Further, the cogito reveals sense as ap-
pearing within our own activity, so if we have to say how sense
appears, to give an account of its ontology, we’d say: it is constituted
by our activity. That doesn’t quite go all the way in accounting for
sense, but it is at least cogent and compelling. Yet, recent work on
the body andMerleau-Ponty says: we don’t wholly or wholly actively
constitute sense, we are passive to the body, life and so on in our own
experience of sense.33 And above, I argued that there is sense in
nature. So, once, again: how is there sense in nature and the body
beyond our own experience?
Here we’re running into an ontological problem. For underneath
the above worry is, I think, an issue about what philosophers call ne-
gation and the negative. Negation is manifest in the cogito’s activity.
Recall Descartes’s argument that grasping the ever changing wax
entails an idea that entirely surpasses any positively given
33 That is, our experience of sense draws on various layers of sense that
are already in operation well before we ourselves try to make sense of things.
Sowe cannotmake sense happen (except perhaps in highly specific linguistic
or symbolic realms, and even then we are drawing on a given language or
symbol system); rather we have to wait for, be oriented by and leverage
what already makes sense. This claim stems from Merleau-Ponty’s key
point across his lectures on Institution and Passivity, which is that we find
in experience a sense that is not bestowed by a wholly active and sovereign
constituting consciousness, but is rather instituted through a living
process, in which what operates as implicitly meaningful in that process
becomes more explicit, articulate and durable, such that the process ends
up articulating new dimensions of meaning, even if that new meaning was
not already contained in the process at the start. As an example, one could
think of accounts wherein deaf children institute their own system of sign
language: their spontaneous gestural efforts of communication (which are
in play prior to their language) latch onto each, and only thereby do the
gestures firm up into stable expressions, engendering a language whose
meaning repertoire could not have been envisioned at the start. They are cer-
tainly active in instituting this language, but only by also being passive to
prior institutions of bodily movement and spontaneous gesture.
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presentation or imaginary image of wax. Only such an idea could let
us comprehend wax as such, so as to judge this-here is wax, not some-
thing else. Similarly, Socrates urges that grasping two sticks as equal
entails an idea of equality that surpasses any positive givens we look
at. Ideas are not given positively, they are negative.
Now sense, as we have described it, entails negation: love is not
hate. But it looks like this sort of negation would have to involve a
sort of activity that surpasses givens. Sartre is the most vociferous ad-
vocate of this position: he argues that the origin of negation and
thence meaning is our nothingness as freeing us from any sort of
positivity.34 So, we have an ontological problem here: how can the
negative be within positively given material nature? Drawing on
Merleau-Ponty, I call this the problem of ‘the negative-in-being’.35
My position troubles the skeptic precisely because I claim that nega-
tion arises in nature, is tainted by life. Indeed the thought that nega-
tion is tainted by life is precisely what prompts sceptical worries that
our cognitive activity might be muddied and mistaken, taken in by a
world to which it is passive.
In response to this sceptical complex, I am going to double down
on phenomenological empiricism. I am going to let life itself
educate us out of this ontological worry and problem by showing
us how there can be a negative-in-being, albeit one that is ontologi-
cally peculiar vis-à-vis our anthropocentric concepts. To do this I
briefly turn to the acquired immune system. There too we find
sense being generated, and in a most remarkable way, precisely
because we mammals can acquire immunity to pathogens never pre-
viously encountered.Howdoes this work? The usual answers amount
to a selectional shuffling of ontologically positive terms. The immune
system hinges on protein receptors that latch onto antigens, in the
manner of locks fitting to keys. But, the very process of generating re-
ceptors randomly reshuffles the ‘locks’, and the body destroys ‘locks’
that would latch onto self antigens. The result is locks keyed only to
pathogens. Scientists and philosophers like Irun Cohen and Henri
Atlan have challenged this essentially informational processing
model, arguing that meaning is actually at stake in the immune
34 See J.-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. H.E. Barnes
(New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1956).
35 Although he himself does not use this term as such,Merleau-Ponty’s
studies of embryology are what alerted me to this issue and to the project I
pursue here. See his lecture notes on Nature and Institution and Passivity.
What I am doing is updating and deepening Merleau-Ponty’s effort by en-
gaging scientific advances since Merleau-Ponty’s time.
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process.36 Further, Cohen contests the anthropocentric lock-and-key
model by focusing on the chemistry of protein receptors, which
reveals that receptors are quite dynamic systems that would never
univocally lock onto just one key. They are sloppy, in biochemical
lingo, ‘degenerate’. To explain how degenerate receptors nonetheless
discriminately identify pathogens, Cohen shows how immune identi-
fication arises when receptors come together in a complex, such that
receptors respond to one another’s degenerate responses, in a process
that Cohen calls ‘co-respondence’.37 In this process, we find a deter-
minate difference or negation arising, without that negation being re-
ducible to some already given positive locks. (The conceptual target
here is analogous to the view that development is specified by an
already given genetic algorithm.) Negation thus arises as a sort of sur-
passing of positive givens fromwithin their own dynamic. Inmy view
this process opens an insight into the negative-in-being.
What interests me here is theway this hinges on whatwe call degen-
erate receptors. For Cohen, this degeneracy is positively given, there
in the receptor itself. But this, I think, is an all too anthropocentric
view and concept. When we say receptors are degenerate, we are
saying: they fit with more than just the one antigen that we’d expect
them to fit. But imagine a receptor that we chemists see can fit A,
B, or C. Yet, in its environment it only ever encounters B. It
doesn’t then actually exhibit what we call degeneracy. This leads
me to realize that degeneracy is a phenomenon manifest relative to,
and enabled by, what the bounds of the cell and body let in (where
these bounds are themselves modulated by the immune system
within). There would be neither degeneracy nor immunological
sense if everything always interacted with everything else at once
(simultaneously).
In my view, the immune system thus yields an insight into what is
ontologically at stake in the negative-in-being. The insight is that if
sense is ever to sneak into being, being has to ‘leave room’ for rup-
tures, boundaries, spacings and distances between things, for non-
connection or incongruence, such that the places where things
happen matters, as do the boundaries and distributions of material
that allow places to stand out as distinct. At bottom, there could
not be sense in an isotropic universe that would not let things
spread out differentially (a principle that echoes Darwin’s realization
36 Henri Atlan and Irun R. Cohen, ‘Immune Information, Self-
Organization and Meaning’, International Immunology 10 (1998).
37 I.R. Cohen, Tending Adam’s Garden: Evolving the Cognitive Immune
Self (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2000).
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that geographical isolation and regions facilitate species differen-
tiation). Here we start getting into ontological concepts that are
hard to articulate because they challenge our deepest anthropocentric
prejudices and the deepest commitments of the sceptical complex,
namely, the need to find some ‘smallest possible’ unit of analysis
(in some sense of ‘small’) that is already given and all at once with
absolute certainty (such a unit would be self-contained as to its deter-
minacy; classically it is the ‘atom’), in some sort of system where the
relations of all parts can be simultaneously given as determinate (clas-
sically, this would be, for example, by way of laws that govern
relations of the atomic units). What’s really at stake underneath
these commitments is the view that something needs to already be
fully and determinately given, in and of itself, if we are to grasp
and explain things, otherwise there is no starting point or foundation
fromwhich our explanations can proceed. And what’s at stake behind
this is the view that if anything is to be certain, then something must
at some point already be given as certain. On the contrary, we are
seeing that the condition of sense is a being that is not given as
already all connected but rather operates as it does through a sort of
operation of figuring itself out, connecting itself up, refiguring
itself, through a distribution across places that is always already un-
derway. This point that I making, which emphasizes a distribution
that ruptures a would-be all-given simultaneity mirrors a point
about time made by philosophers like Henri Bergson and scientists
like Ilya Prigogine. They argue that time is real and makes a differ-
ence to being as ‘successive’. Time is not a dimension given in
advance, but ‘figures itself out’ through duration. I am saying that
a sort of distribution that ruptures being is real andmakes a difference
to being as ‘simultaneous’. Put otherwise, for Bergson, being is not
really ‘successive’ because the notion of succession puts succeedents
spatially alongside one another, as if succeedents are already lined up,
ready to go. But I am saying being is not ‘simultaneous’ either: parts
are not really simultaneously alongside one another, you have to get
from one to the other through a distribution that is always already un-
derway, that ruptures being, and that takes place across places. This is
what’s at stake in speaking of being as ‘figuring itself out’ (in the sense
of giving itself a figure—not of deliberate problem solving). Being
and space do not have an already given figure, space is not a given
figure, being is a ‘figuring out’, and only in virtue of that does
being have a determinate endurance and distribution. Indeed, at
this point we find a conceptual analogy between a developing organ-
ism and being itself: just as an organism develops in situ, via inherited
dynamics already underway, we would have to think of being/the
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cosmos as distributing itself not through abstract laws, but through
differences endogenous and unique to it as a historical phenomenon.
The difference is that the organism’s development takes place in a
larger environment and dynamic, whereas the coming-to-be of the
cosmos takes place as a making place in the first place, and it is its
own dynamic.
All this leads me to the difficult thought that if there is a sense in
being, this is because being is a sort of non-coincidence, such that
being is never purely identical or equal with itself, it is marked by a
kind of difference that is nonetheless yet to be shown. Being thus
always surpasses itself, but from within, not because of some
already given ideal independent of being. This would almost say:
being is sense; it is oriented by its own being as differing, or dislocated
from itself. Earlier I said that the sceptical complex worries that its
point of view, which is the locus of cognitive activity, might be dislo-
cated from itself, from the safe-harbour of the cogito; theworry is that
cognition might be embedded in a body or nature that would thereby
taint, disrupt or subject thinking to doubt. Here I am led to the
thought that perhaps the fundamental dynamic of being just is a
sort of non-unitary dislocation that challenges any effort to find any-
thing, let alone a point of view, that is what it is in some purely loca-
lized or unitary fashion. Being is itself embedded in something
further, but that something further is its own dislocation. Put in
terms closer to contemporary science, I could say: being is uncer-
tainty itself. It is not positively given (not even as an already estab-
lished probability pattern), but neither is it a purely negative ideal
that could be grasped as pure information. Rather, as uncertainty,
it does not coincide with itself in its givenness. And, as uncertainty,
being itself would be the standard in virtue of which information, un-
derstood as determinate distributions of probability actualizations,
becomes information. Information would thus not be abstract, but
immanent in being. Being as uncertainty would thus be sense. I
know these thoughts are hard to follow, but they might help us
grasp how meaning is an institution older than human experience,
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